










The Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation (CHERE) was 
established in 1991.  CHERE is a centre of excellence in health economics and 
health services research. It is a joint Centre of the Faculties of Business 
and Nursing, Midwifery and Health at the University of Technology, Sydney, in 
collaboration with Central Sydney Area Health Service. It was established as a 
UTS Centre in February, 2002. The Centre aims to contribute to the development 
and application of health economics and health services research through 
research, teaching and policy support. CHERE’s research program encompasses 
both the theory and application of health economics. The main theoretical 
research theme pursues valuing benefits, including understanding what 
individuals value from health and health care, how such values should be 
measured, and exploring the social values attached to these benefits. The 
applied research  focuses on economic and the appraisal of new programs or new 
ways of delivering and/or funding services. CHERE’s teaching includes 
introducing clinicians, health services managers, public health professionals 
and others to health economic principles. Training programs aim to develop 
practical skills in health economics and health services research. Policy 
support is provided at all levels of the health care system by undertaking 
commissioned projects, through the provision of formal and informal advice as 
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Cost-utility analysis, combining mortality effects with health-related quality of life 
effects, has become the preferred method for presenting economic evaluation. It 
allows comparability between potential investments in different areas of health 
and healthcare as the outcomes are generic and designed to be applicable in 
multiple contexts. There are various methods for estimating health-related quality 
of life scores but one major approach is the use of the Time Trade-Off. Evidence 
has suggested that scores from this measure are relatively lower than from other 
measures. We argue that one possible reason for this is that the TTO method 
artificially deflates valuation scores because it does not take account of time 
preference. The extent of the deflation depends on the duration of survival 
offered for the health state in question, the true valuation placed on that state, 
and the individual’s rate of time preference. This has implications for the use of 
TTO valuation scores in economic evaluation, particularly when models are 






Cost-utility analysis, which aims to compare interventions across different 
areas of health and healthcare, requires valuation of health outcomes, usually 
in the metric of quality adjusted life years (QALYs), such that the survival 
duration in the health state is multiplied by a preference weight that reflects 
the value of the health state relative to full health. Increasingly, valuations of 
health states are developed by use of a generic quality of life instrument (a 
multi-attribute utility instrument) in the population of interest, for example, 
patients in a randomised controlled trial. Such instruments comprise a generic 
health state descriptive system and a scoring algorithm, where the scoring 
algorithm has been developed using statistical analysis of data from a 
preference elicitation task in a random sample drawn from the general 
community.   
 
The most widely used example of this approach is the EQ-5D,  particularly the 
UK algorithm (Dolan, Gudex, Kind, & Williams, 1996), which is now 
recommended as the preferred approach to valuation of health states in the 
revised guidelines of the National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence 
(2007). Algorithms for the EQ-5D have now been developed using the TTO 
method in in most countries that frequently employ economic evaluation in 
their decision-making process (with the notable exceptions of Canada and 
Australia). (Norman, Cronin, Viney, King, Street, Brazier et al., 2007) The 
methods used in the studies has been similar, allowing comparison of scores 
between countries, and further establishing the precedence of the TTO based 
EQ-5D valuation approach. While other valuation methods are also used, 
particularly rating scales and standard gambles (and more recently discrete 
choice experiments), the TTO has become widely accepted as a standard 
approach for economic evaluation. 
 
TTO was developed by Torrance et al.(1972). In TTO, health state valuations 
are typically derived through stated preference experiments in which 
individuals identify the proportion of a given survival duration they would 
forego to be returned to full health. While it is not mandated by any 
  
proponents of TTO,  the convention is for this period to be 10 years. The 
typical approach recommended is to present a hypothetical scenario of 10 
years in the health state of interest and then, through a series of structured 
questions determine how many years of duration the respondent will forgo to 
be ‘returned’ to full health (ie the point at which the respondent is indifferent 
between 10 years in the health state of interest and less than 10 years in full 
health). Where the hypothetical health state is a stand-alone vignette, the final 
valuation is generally estimated as the sample mean. This approach imposes 
a cardinal utility function, scaled such that the value of full health is unity and 
the value of death is zero. 
 
In the valuation studies, the societal valuation placed on a particular state i is 
assumed to be a function of the characteristics associated with that state (for 
example, in the EQ-5D, they use Mobility, Self-Care, Usual Activities, 
Pain/Discomfort and Anxiety/Depression) i.e., 
 
Societal valuation of state Si =  ( ) xi f      (1) 
 
where xi is a vector of levels for the attributes of state i, where the attributes of 
interest are dimensions of quality of life described by ordered levels (typically 
from no problems to severe problems). Regression analysis is used to 
estimate the contribution of each level of each dimension to the overall score, 
based on the the TTO valuations given by the respondents in the sample. The 
form of the utility function is often assumed to be additive, although 
multiplicative approaches have also been advocated. (Feeny, 2006)  While 
demographics play a role at the individual level, the convention has been to 
focus on societal valuations and therefore exclude individual level 
characteristics in the analysis, and therefore in the resulting algorithms.  
 
The TTO works within the constraints conventionally considered to underpin 
the QALY model, as first formalised by Pliskin et al (1980) for preferences are 
defined over a chronic (constant) health state and survival. They show that for 
this specification of the utility function, the QALY model holds if preferences 
  
conform to the von Neumann Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility axioms, 
namely that there is mutual utility independence between health states and 
life years, constant proportional trade-off between health status and life years 
and individuals are risk neutral with respect to life years. Utility independence 
implies that preferences defined over life years, with health state held 
constant do not depend on the health state. Mutual utility independence holds 
if this is true for both attributes (thus, if life years are held constant, utility 
depends only on the health state). Constant proportional trade-off between life 
years and health states implies that the proportion of remaining life years an 
individual is willing to give up for a defined improvement in quality of life is 
independent of the number of remaining life years. Thus, the utility associated 
with x years in a health state is proportional to the value of x e.g. doubling the 
time doubles the utility.
1 
 
Bleichrodt et al. (1997) and Miyamoto et al. (1998) simplify these restrictions 
by showing that for for preferences defined over constant health states over 
time the QALY model will hold under VNM expected utility if there is risk 
neutrality with respect to life years and the zero condition, which in this case 
requires that all health states are equally preferred when the duration of life is 
zero. Given that the zero condition is non-controversial in the health context, 
the key restriction for the QALY model under constant health states is risk 
neutrality with respect to life years. As noted by Bleichrodt et al. (1997)  risk 
neutrality with respect to life years imposes a linear utility function over life 
years, and thus implies utility independence and constant proportional trade-
off. 
 
Empirical tests of these restictions tend to focus either on tests of utility 
independence, tests of constant proportional trade-off or both. Relatively few 
papers directly test risk neutrality with respect to survival.  The results of these 
tests are variable, but suggest overall that the QALY restrictions may not be 
                                                 
1 There are possible exceptions to this, such as in situations where health states are good enough to be 
tolerated for a short period of time to complete necessary arrangements prior to death, but intolerable 
over a longer period. Empirical support for such exceptions is provided by Sutherland et al (Sutherland, 
Llewellyn-Thomas, Boyd, & Till, 1982) who evaluate preferences for a range of different health states 
with varying durations. Their findings suggest that, for relatively poor health states, the utility function 
is non-monotonic with respect to additional survival.  
  
empirically supported.  Bleichrodt et al. (1997) use modified SG and TTO 
tasks to test the constant proportional trade-off and utility independence 
restrictions of the QALY model.  Their results provide support for constant 
proportional trade-off but not for  utility independence
2.  Bleichrodt et al. 
(2003) use TTO and SG experiments to test constant proportional trade-off 
and utility independence. Overall their findings reject constant proportional 
trade-off.  A second experiment in the same study adds a test of utility 
independence of quality of life from survival duration and allows comparison 
of the QALY weights arising from TTO and SG tasks. The study extends 
Bleichrodt et al. (1997) by comparing across more survival durations, and by 
avoiding durations that are simple multiples of 10. Their, the results suggest 
loss aversion for short durations, but constant proportional trade-off is not 
always rejected. However the comparison across SG tasks rejects utility 
independence. They also find that the TTO QALY weights are greater than 
the SG QALY weights for short durations (which contrasts with most other 
comparisons of the methods), but the SG QALY weights are greater for longer 
durations. Spencer and Robinson (2007) have tested utility independence and 
argue that it generally holds.  
  
Other studies have also rejected linearity of the utility function with respect to 
survival duration (as implied by constant proportional trade-off). For example, 
Unic et al. (1998) investigate women’s preferences in relation to breast cancer 
treatments using a TTO task with a range of durations, and find significant 
differences in TTO QALY weights, suggesting a non-linear utility function with 
respect to duration.  Similarly, the TTO QALY weights in Stiggelbout et al. 
(1994) in a study of testicular cancer are found to be dependent on the 
specified duration. 
 
Spencer identifies potential reasons why TTO scores might differ from true 
valuation if we erroneously impose the QALY assumptions. (Spencer, 2003) 
One consideration is the issue of time preference is conventionally not 
considered but affects how individuals perceive the value of a future event.  
                                                 
2 They find larger differences in the implied QALY weights across different durations in the SG task 
than in the TTO task. 
  
Variability in time preference is found by Ganiats et al  (2000) who use a 
series of binary discrete choices to examine time preferences in relation to 
future health outcomes across a range of disease settings, and find that 
across the different settings time preference ranges from a negative discount 
rates to a very high positive discount rate. Similarly Chapman and Coups 
(1999) find that a majority of respondents exhibit a zero rate of time 
preference in relation to poor health states (are indifferent between bad health 
now or in the future) and a negative rate of time preference in relation to an 
improving health profile. These findings not only suggest that the utility 
function is not linear with respect to duration (as do the studies discussed 
above) but also provide evidence against utility independence, because the 
rate of time preference appears to be dependent on the health states 
considered. 
 
It is important to note that the restrictions of the QALY model are embedded in 
the mechanics of economic evaluation (the decision analysis framework which 
relies on expected utility and utility independence) and in the specific 
preference elicitation methods (TTO and SG) (which rely on expected utility 
and risk neutrality with respect to survival) used to estimate QALY based 
valuations of treatment outcomes.  While models which relax these have been 
discussed in the literature (Pliskin, Shepard, & Weinstein, 1980) (Bleichrodt & 
Quiggin, 1999) these approaches are less tractable for evaluation. These 
models provide more flexible forms of QALYs (such as risk adjusted QALYs, 
or time non-linear QALYs), but at the cost of more complex policy evaluation 
in determining the value of particular health states or profiles of health states. 
As a result they have not been used in economic evaluation in practice.  
 
Thus, if the TTO based QALY is to fit within the framework contained within 
Equation (1), it is necessary to assume that individuals are risk neutral with 
respect to survival. The implication of this is that they will have a zero rate of 
time preference (at least this is imposed in the preference elicitation task, if 
not in the subsequent economic evaluations). In reality, this is highly unlikely 
and evidence from previous studies suggests that there is only limited support 
to justify this assumption. The implication is that if this is not taken into 
  
account when TTO valuations are derived, there will be systematic bias in the 
quality of life values given to health states other than full health. In this paper 
we focus on the bias introduced by TTO methods.  The aims are:  
1)  to identify the scale of deflation associated with time preference under 
the TTO;  
2)  to  illustrate the variables which affect the scale of the deflation; and  
3)   to consider the implication for economic evaluation of using TTO 
scores for all utility measures, and then for using them alongside 
scores derived from other measures such as the Visual Analogue 
Scale (VAS) or Standard Gamble (SG).  
 
Estimation of effect 
 
States Better Than Immediate Death 
 
For states considered preferable to immediate death, the TTO presents the 
respondent with a choice of 10 years (by convention) in a health state i and y 
years in full health. The aim of the TTO is to identify the value of y at which 
the individual is indifferent between the two options. 
 
  





























In Figure 1, the assumption is that, if the person is indifferent between Options 
A and B, the areas under the two lines is equal. That is: 
 
() ( ) i V MAX U FH y U , , =  (2) 
 
Where y is the period offered in full health (FH), MAX is the period offered in 
state i (by convention, 10 years) and Vi is the underlying valuation of the 
health state i. Under the QALY assumptions, this equality is achieved when 
 
Vt y =      (3) 
 
To generate Si (converting y on to a scale bounded by 0 and 1), y is then 
divided by 10. 
 
Regarding the method for summing utility across years, equation 3 is a 
special case in that it implicitly assumes that there is no discounting. 
(Sydsaeter & Hammond, 1995) The issue that needs to be considered is the 
  
more general case under which the net present value (NPV) of the two 
options is likely to differ from the areas under the curves in Figure 1 since 
both options are subject to time preference. Additionally, since they occur 
over different lengths of time, the options will not be subject to a comparable 
proportional reduction in the net present value. 
  
The initial approach here is to apply a fixed rate of time preference to Option 
A and Option B. The present value of flow of years into the future can be 
estimated by the sum of a geometric progression. This is true as, assuming 
the health state is chronic over time, the NPV of year (x+1) is the product of 
the NPV of year x and the exponent of the discount rate.  
 





























If the individual is indifferent at the point shown in Figure 2, the TTO would 
assign the health state in Option B a value of 0.3. However, as a result of both 
Options being discounted, the true valuation of the health state in Option B 
will differ from 0.3 (we aim to show that, to make the areas under the two 
curves equal, the starting point for Option B has to be higher than 0.3). 
  
 
This can be illustrated in the following way: The NPV of Option A and B are 
the sums of geometric progressions such that 
 












Where r is the discount rate (for example, for a five percent discount rate, r = 
1.05
-1), y is the number of years offered in full health, V is the value of the first 
year (0.3 in Figure 2), and MAX is the maximum period offered in either health 
state (conventionally 10 years in TTO). 
   
Using the sum of a geometric progression on both t years in the less than full 
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1 1 ln − −
=             (6) 
   
As noted previously, y is then divided by 10 to give a score between 0 and 1. 
The effect of discount rate on apparent value of health state i is shown for a 
range of underlying health values where MAX = 10 in  
Figure 3.  
 
  
























True Value = 0.25
True Value = 0.5
True Value = 0.75
 
 
This is a significant result as it suggests the extent to which valuations derived 
from conventional TTO tasks are likely to underestimate true preferences 
once time preference is introduced. This underestimation depends on 
discount rate, the period offered in state i and the underlying health state 
valuation. If r = 1.05
-1 (i.e. a 5% discount rate), the greatest difference 
between underlying health state valuation and TTO score occurs when the 
valuation of the underlying health state is 0.54. This maximum difference is 
0.0608. If r = 1.035
































This explanation provides a contributory factor to the findings of Petrou and 
Hockley (2005) who find a statistically significant difference of 0.046 (p<0.001) 
in self-reported health between TTO and standard gamble methods, and that 
this exists across all levels of self-reported health. Standard Gamble is not 
affected by time preference since the years on offer within the gamble do not 
differ between the options, only the chance of receiving them. 
 
States Worse than Immediate Death 
 
If the respondent considers a state worse than immediate death, the 
conventional TTO question cannot be used (as any period in full health is 
preferable to 10 years in Si). The approach most commonly used in the 
literature is to ask a similar question, offering immediate death or a period p in 
this poor health state, followed by (10-p) in full health, followed by death. The 
point of indifference is reached as with states considered better than 
immediate death, and then converted on to a -1 to 0 scale, by dividing p by 
10, and subtracting 1. This bounding of states between -1 and 0 is, as with 
bounding states better than death between 0 and 1, conventional and done to 
  
prevent the scale of the valuation of states worse than death from dwarfing 
those of states better than death.   
 

























As with states better than death, this decision can be represented graphically. 
The period in full health (in Figure 5, the period between 7.5 and 10 years) is 
subject to a greater proportional decrease in value upon introduction of 
conventional time preference than the 7.5 years preceding it. Thus, an 
artificially large period in full health is required to offset the experience of poor 
health, reducing p, and therefore artificially deflating the health-related quality 
of life score. 
 
  

























As with states better than immediate death, the relationship between 
underlying valuation of a health state and TTO score allowing for time 
preference can be calculated. As before, the effect of including time 
preference varies according to underlying valuation of the health state and the 
assumed discount rate. This relationship is shown in Figure 7. 
 
  

























In this class of states, the TTO method artificially deflates health state 
valuation, particularly at scores with an absolute value between 0.4 and 0.6. 
While the occurrence of states worse than immediate death is relatively 
uncommon, this result is also important when health-related quality of life is 




The importance of this result lies in the fact that the conventional TTO method 
undervalues all chronic health states. Therefore, if an economic evaluation 
includes weights from different sources, the one outcome valued under the 
TTO will be unfairly discriminated against. While this is particularly important 
when evaluators use different sources of utility weights, it should also be 
considered when evaluators use solely TTO methods as the deflation of 
values occurs to different degrees for different health states. 
 
One further issue with the discount rate is the assumption that individuals 
discount at a constant rate. This is attractive to economic evaluation as it 
enforces stationarity. This means that there is a constant trade-off rate 
  
between pairs of years equally divided in terms of time (Cairns, 2001). 
However, there is good evidence that suggests a more hyperbolic approach is 
more predictive of human behaviour (Camerer, 1999). If an increasingly lower 
discount rate were applied as time is extended forward, the effect on TTO 
scores would be to artificially inflate them, as the relatively greater discounting 
of chronic conditions over longer periods would be less severe. This 
uncertainty surrounding how to precisely quantify how individuals discount 
future events is important as it precludes the option of adjusting TTO scores 
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